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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Shawn Jerri Coats appeals from his convictions for three counts of grand theft, three
counts of forgery, and one count of fraudulent use of a financial transaction card, enhanced for
being a persistent violator. On appeal, he asserts (1) that there was insufficient evidence to
support one of the charges of grand theft (Count V) and (2) that conviction on both that contested
charge of grand theft (Count V) and on the charge of fraudulent use of a financial transaction
card (Count VII) violated double jeopardy.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On June 28, 2015, Theodore Morgan found himself in a very poor financial situation.
(Tr., vol. II, p.48, Ls.20-22.) Between his house bill, two vehicle bills, and other household
expenses, he was reduced to borrowing money just to make ends meet each month. (Id., p.49,
L.8 – p.50, L.5.) That evening, Mr. Morgan spoke with Coats, and Coats offered to help him by
writing him a check. (Id., p.51, L.2 – p.52, L.2.) Coats asked for nothing in return, and Mr.
Morgan was very grateful. (Id., p.52, Ls.12-17.) They drove together to Mr. Morgan’s bank
and, with Coats standing right behind Mr. Morgan, deposited a check for $955.00, made out on
the account of Zacarias Garcia, at the ATM. (Tr., vol. I, p.118, Ls.11-13; vol. II, p.52, L.18 –
p.54, L.22; State’s Ex. 6.)
Coats told Mr. Morgan that he needed $500.00, so they inserted another check for
$950.00, again made out on the account of Zacarias Garcia, and Mr. Morgan returned $500.00 to
Coats. (Tr., vol. I, p.118, Ls.14-15; vol. II p.54, L.23 – p.55, L.12; State’s Ex. 7.) Later that
evening, Coats asked to borrow Mr. Morgan’s truck. (Tr., vol. II, p.56, Ls.18-20.) Reluctantly,
Mr. Morgan agreed to allow Coats to borrow his truck to quickly drive to Garden City and back,
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and Mr. Morgan went to bed. (Id., p.57, Ls.9-25.) It was four days later before Mr. Morgan saw
his truck again. (Id., p.58, Ls.22-24; p.132, L.25 – p.133, L.6.)
In the meantime, Mr. Morgan’s truck was not the only thing missing; he also could not
find his ATM card. (Id., p.59, Ls.18-22.) He had not authorized anyone to use it. (Id., p.59,
L.23 – p.60, L.11.) Yet Coats was out using Mr. Morgan’s ATM card to finance, inter alia, a
Walmart shopping spree. (See
- - Tr., vol. I, p.132, L.10 – p.134, L.7; p.137, L.17 – p.138, L.8;
p.142, L.21 – p.143, L.15; vol. II, p.44, Ls.5-22; p.104, Ls.15-25.) Recognizing fraudulent
activity, the bank shut down the account. (Tr., vol. I, p.145, Ls.2-4; vol. II, p.28, Ls.14-20; p.61,
L.23 – p.62, L.4.)
The state charged Coats with three counts of grand theft, three counts of forgery, and two
counts of criminal possession of a financial transaction card, and the state filed a persistent
violator enhancement. (R., pp.89-91, 123-25.) Coats pleaded not guilty and went to trial on all
counts. (Tr., vol. I, pp.15-148; vol. II, pp.20-280.) At the end of that jury trial, the jury returned
guilty verdicts on all counts of grand theft and forgery, and on one of the counts of criminal
possession of a financial transaction card (R., pp.185-91); the jury returned a not guilty verdict
on the second count of criminal possession of a financial transaction card (R., p.192); and the
jury found the persistent violator enhancement (R., p.196).
The district court entered judgment against Coats on all guilty verdicts and enhancement,
and sentenced him to concurrent terms of 15 years with five years fixed on each count. (R.,
p.199-202.) Coats filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.204-05.)
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ISSUES
Coats states the issues on appeal as:
I.
Did the State fail to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. Coats
committed grand theft of retail goods or services during a criminal episode?
II.
Did Mr. Coats’s convictions and punishments for grand theft of retail
goods or services during a criminal episode and fraudulent use of a financial
transaction card violate his right to be free of double jeopardy?
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Was substantial competent evidence admitted at trial from which the jury could conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that Coats was guilty of the grand theft charged in Count V of the
amended information?
2.
Does Coats’s conviction on both Counts V and VII, under the specific facts of this case,
violate his double jeopardy rights?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Substantial Competent Evidence Admitted At Trial Supports The Jury’s Conclusion That Coats
Was Guilty Of Grand Theft (Count V)
A.

Introduction
The state charged Coats with, inter alia, grand theft, under the theory that he
did wrongfully obtain retail goods or other services with an aggregate value over
$50, stolen [during] three or more incidents of theft, which was stolen as part of a
criminal episode over a period of up to three days from the owner, Theodore
Morgan and/or Walmart, with the intent to appropriate to himself certain property
of another.

(R., pp.123-24 (Count V).) At the conclusion of his trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on
that charge. (R., p.189.) On appeal, Coats argues that there was insufficient evidence for a jury
to convict him of this specific charge of grand theft. (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-11.) Review of the
trial record, however, demonstrates that the jury’s verdict is supported by substantial competent
evidence presented at trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a verdict if

there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d
603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In
conducting this review, the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the finder of fact
as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607. The facts,
and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding the verdict. Id.
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In determining whether sufficient evidence to support a conviction was presented at trial, the
Court reviews the evidence that was actually presented to the jury without regard to its ultimate
admissibility. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 894, 231 P.3d 532, 539 (Ct. App. 2010).

C.

Coats’s Conviction Is Supported By Substantial Evidence
Under Idaho Code § 18-2407, grand theft is defined, among other things, as “a theft”

wherein property that “has an aggregate value over fifty dollars ($50.00)” is “stolen during three
(3) or more incidents of theft during a criminal episode,” meaning within the course of three
consecutive days. I.C. § 18-2407(1)(b)(9). The Idaho Code defines “theft” as the wrongful
taking, obtaining, or withholding property from the owner, with the intent to deprive that owner
of the property. I.C. § 18-2403(1). Evidence presented at Coats’s criminal trial established that
he committed grand theft by using Theodore Morgan’s ATM card to obtain retail goods and
services from Walmart with an aggregate value of more than $50, over the course of three or
more incidents within a single criminal episode.
An investigation by an employee for Walmart’s loss prevention/asset protection team
identified Coats making several transactions at their Meridian store on June 29 and 30, 2015.
(Tr., vol. II, p.44, Ls.5-20; State’s Exs. 25, 28.) On June 29, Coats used Mr. Morgan’s ATM
card to make purchases at Walmart totaling at least $1,487.15 in at least four separate
transactions: the first for $348.53; the second for $504.00; the third for $503.95; and the fourth
for $130.67. (State’s Ex. 1; see also Tr., vol. II, p.104, Ls.15-25.) On June 30, Coats again used
Mr. Morgan’s ATM card to make purchases at Walmart, this time totaling $2,415.00 in four
separate transactions: the first for $903.00; and three subsequent transactions for $504.00, each.
(Id.) Coats did not have Mr. Morgan’s authorization to use his ATM card. (Tr., vol. II, p.59,
L.23 – p.60, L.11.) All told, Coats unlawfully used Mr. Morgan’s ATM card to make at least
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$3,902.15 in purchases from Walmart across at least eight transactions over the course of two
days.
On appeal, Coats acknowledges that the evidence presented at trial showed that, across
several transactions in two days, he used Mr. Morgan’s debit card to make more than $50.00 in
purchases from Walmart. (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-9.) Coats argues, however, that the state
failed to show that he stole the property from Walmart because Walmart was paid in full, and
that the state failed to show that he stole the property from Mr. Morgan because Mr. Morgan
never owned or possessed the goods. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-11.) Coats is mistaken.
Theft, as shown above, is not merely taking property from the lawful owner, but also
obtaining and withholding property from the owner, with the intent to deprive the owner of the
property. See I.C. § 18-2403(1). And, as defined in the Idaho Code, the owner of property is
“any person who has a right to possession [of such property] superior to that of the taker,
obtainer, or withholder.” I.C. § 18-2402(6). It is undisputed that Coats, without authorization,
used money from Mr. Morgan’s banking account to purchase goods and obtain cash from
Walmart. Because Coats used Mr. Morgan’s money to obtain those goods, Mr. Morgan has a
superior claim on those goods. Coats did not then relinquish those goods to Mr. Morgan; he
withheld them. The jury could draw the reasonable inference from the evidence presented at trial
(such as Coats never returning with Mr. Morgan’s truck (see Tr., vol. II, p.83, Ls.4-13)) that
Coats intended to deprive Mr. Morgan of those goods, to which Mr. Morgan had the superior
claim. That is theft.
Coats’s criminal transactions at Walmart fall squarely under the definition of grand theft
in Idaho Code § 18-2407(1)(b)(9), set forth above. The state presented substantial competent
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evidence of Coats’s crimes, whereby the jury could conclude that he was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. The jury’s verdict is therefore proper and should be affirmed.

II.
Conviction On Both Counts V And VII, Under The Specific Facts Of This Case, Violated
Coats’s Double Jeopardy Rights
A.

Introduction
The state charged Coats with, inter alia, grand theft, I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), -2407(1)(b), -

2409 (Count V), and criminal possession of a financial transaction card, I.C. §§ 18-3125, -3128
(Count VII). The factual bases for these charges were, respectively,
That the Defendant, SHAWN TERRI COATS, on or between the 29th day
of June, 2015, and the 30th day of June, 2015 in the County of Ada, State of
Idaho, did wrongfully obtain retail goods or other services with an aggregate
value over $ 50, stolen [during] three or more incidents of theft, which was stolen
as part of a criminal episode over a period of up to three days from the owner,
Theodore Morgan and/or Walmart, with the intent to appropriate to himself
certain property of another.
(R., p.124 (Count V).) And:
That the Defendant, SHAWN TERRI COATS, on or between the 29th day
of June, 2015 and the 30th day of June, 2015, in the County of Ada, State of
Idaho, did, with the intent to defraud, knowingly obtain goods and/or property
from Walmart by the use of a fraudulently obtained financial transaction card.
(R., p.125 (Count VII).)
For the first time on appeal, Coats claims that these two charges, as pled, subjected him
to double jeopardy. (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-16.) Because this issue was not preserved below,
Coats correctly presents his argument under the fundamental error doctrine articulated by the
Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010). (Id., pp.12-16.) It
appears that Coats is correct.
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B.

Standard Of Review
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts will only review an alleged error under the

fundamental error doctrine. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Whether a defendant has
been placed in jeopardy twice is a question of law, given free review. State v. Bush, 131 Idaho
22, 33, 951 P.2d 1249, 1260 (1997).

C.

Because, Under The Specific Facts Of This Case, Count VII Is An Included Offense Of
Count V, It Should Be Merged Into Count V
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. This clause affords a defendant three basic protections: It
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution
for the same offense after conviction; and multiple criminal punishments for the same offense.
Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994).
The test for determining whether a single act that violated two statutes constituted one or
two separate offenses was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Under that test, a single criminal act may be considered two
separate offenses only where each statute requires the prosecution to prove some fact that the
other does not. Id. at 304. The state agrees that, under the specific facts of this case, the
fraudulent use of the financial transaction card, I.C. § 18-3125(4), was a lesser included offense
of the grand theft, I.C. § 18-2407(1)(b)(9), because to be guilty of the fraudulent use of the debit
card did not require Coats’s withholding from, with an intent to deprive, the rightful owner of the
property acquired, which was required to sustain the grand theft charge, I.C. § 18-2403(1).
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“Under both the federal and Idaho double jeopardy clauses, a defendant may not be
convicted of both a greater and lesser included offense.” State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837,
841, 291 P.3d 1036, 1040 (2013) (internal quotation omitted). While criminal possession of a
financial transaction card would not always be an included offense of grand theft, under the
specific facts of this case, the charges should have been set forth in the alternative, and the
conviction for fraudulent use of the financial transaction card should be merged into the grand
theft conviction.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Coats’s conviction for grand theft,
Count V, and merge his conviction for fraudulent possession of a financial transaction card,
Count VII, into that conviction.
DATED this 28th day of December, 2017.

/s/ Russell J. Spencer___________________
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of December, 2017, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy to:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Russell J. Spencer____________________
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
RJS/dd
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